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is interesting to ask if capital regulation effectively contributed to strengthen banks operating in emerging 
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since it seems obvious that more conformity of banks to capital standards induced more profitability to these 
institutions, restricted their leverage and strengthened their ability to hedge anticipated losses during distress 
episodes. However, the results also show that in emerging countries, contrary to developed countries, higher 
conformity to capital standards was not followed by an improvement in credit quality. Consequently, we remain 
doubtful toward the ability of this prudential mechanism in achieving his principal target in emerging countries’ 
banking systems that is reducing credit risk. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) was created in order to work 
for harmonization at the international level of capital standards applied to the financial 
institutions; such a harmonization had not been established ever before. Since the end of the 
70’s the Committee had published a set of instructions aiming the harmonization of the 
banking surveillance in G10 countries. Some years later, the Committee, influenced in part by 
the agreement on bank capital requirements established in January 1987 between United 
States of America and United Kingdom (Hall, 1999), moved toward the establishment of 
common standards governing capital adequacy in internationally active banks. The 
Committee had published in July 1988 a document titled "The Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards", presenting, in detail, the regulatory framework accepted 
and adopted by the Committee’s members1. Before and especially since this initiative more 
known as Cooke ratio, the theoretical and empirical researches sought to verify the impact of 
such a regulation on bank stability. Recently, this field of research showed concern about 
banks operating in emerging countries; researchers began progressively to recognize that the 
adoption of such a prudential rule would necessarily have a long-term desirable effect on bank 
stability in these countries, mainly on bank loans quality.    
   
The study try to assess empirically how capital adequacy standards influence bank stability, 
because this regulatory ratio is still adopted by the majority of emerging countries 
jurisdictions. Moreover, this method is very similar to standard evaluation of regulatory 
capital defined under Basel II (Powell, 2002, 2004). Besides, as the Financial Stability 
Institute2 – FSI (2004, 2006) expects, almost all banking authorities in emerging countries 
will be able to make operational advanced Basel II directives not before 2015. Thus, this 
paper aims to check if capital standards, as defined by the Committee, have played an 
effective role in increasing commercial bank’s stability in emerging countries. Sections 2 
presents the Basel accords on capital adequacy, and try to summarize the academic discussion 
over the role of bank capital requirements. Empirical works that tried to judge the influence of 
capital standards on bank behaviour and probability of default will be exposed in the section 3. 
The section 4 will present the empirical methodology and the results. Finally, section 5 
concludes this paper. 
 
II. Basle Capital Standards 
 
The Cooke ratio (CAR) is measured as the ratio of eligible capital instruments on risk 
weighted assets3. The Committee fixed a minimum of 8% for this ratio, so each bank should 
continually maintain an amount of capital superior to 8% of total risk weighted assets (in and 
off-balance sheet). The numerator of CAR ratio should contain eligible equity capital and 
complementary capital, while the denominator is composed of risk weights tied to different 
categories of assets held by the bank, these assets include also off-balance sheet items, interest 
rate and exchange rate instruments (cf. Appendix).   
   
                                                 
1
 United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, 
Japan, as well as Switzerland and Luxemburg. These countries are represented by their respective banking 
supervisory authorities. Besides, the Committee of Basel on the Banking Control meets four times per year in 
order to discuss on the advanced of development of the common norms of capital. 
2
 An institute created jointly in 1999 by the Bank for International Settlements and the Committee. 
3
 See the appendix. 
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In his 84th meeting in 1997, the Committee4 had proposed an initiative to modernize the 
Cooke ratio so that capital requirements will be more in phase with the development of 
financial markets and practices. Thus, in reaction to international banks requests the 
Committee proposed in 1998 a new measure of bank capital requirements that use an internal 
model approach to compute credit risk. However, the Committee members thought that this 
approach was, at that time, still inefficient making banks not able to assess effectively credit 
risk and to cover it with adequate capital. After rejecting this proposition, in 1999 the 
Committee tried another solution that aims to use internal notations to build adequate bank 
capital. Then, Basel II, whose the last revised framework was published in June 2004, was put 
in place. Basel II explored two new regulatory options: supervision (the second pillar) and 
market discipline (the third pillar) added to the capital requirements (the first pillar). Besides, 
the first pillar includes three measures of capital requirements: credit risk, market risk 
(already considered by the Cooke ratio) as well as operational risk.   
 
In the 70’s, a very interesting discussion5 was born in the United States of America around the 
efficiency of leverage restrictions applied to banks operating under the supervision of the 
Federal reserve Bank (Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Some authors advocated this kind of 
regulation consisting in imposing a minimal threshold on the amount of capital that will be 
used by banks to finance projects (Sharp, 1978; Keeley, 1988; Furlong and Keeley, 1989; 
Rochet 19926; Freixas and Gabillon, 1999; Santos, 1999; Cooper and Ross, 2002; Repullo, 
2004; etc.). They consider that the capital regulation cause banks:   
   
 To avoid financing very risky projects, because if it not the case, the bank should offer 
itself a bigger guarantee (more equity capital investment),  
 To clean-off balance sheet from bad projects, for the same reason mentioned above, 
 To choice prudent investments rather than risky ones, especially because the option 
value of insured debts7 may create a moral hazard when the insurance premium is not 
adequately priced, 
 To provide her self a sufficient and immediately available cushion in case where 
investments outcome turn bad after a recession or any economic or financial systemic 
downturn.   
   
Whereas authors who were sceptic toward such a prudential mechanism (Koehn and 
Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992; Berger and ali., 1996; Besanko 
and Kanatas, 1996; Blum, 1999; Calem and Robb, 1999; Hellman and ali., 2000; Kopecky 
and Van Hoose, 2006; etc.) claimed that capital requirements may induce:   
 
 The inability of banks to satisfy regulatory capital requirements, since their financial 
structure and the high cost of equity don't enable them to place at their own disposal a 
minimal amount of capital. Therefore banks will tend to overcome this situation by 
                                                 
4
 Tom de Swaan was the Committee’s chairman at this time. 
5
 See Santos (2001) and VanHoose (2007) for an overview of this discussion. 
6
 Nevertheless, in his paper Rochet advocates the fact that assets risks must be adequately priced and that adding 
a simple leverage ratio restriction to a risk-based capital standards will induce banks to behave with more 
caution.   
7
 If we consider the insurance of bank debts as a put option on assets then the shareholders will have the right to 
exercise this right by selling assets at a strinking price equal to the debt value at maturity (Merton, 1977). Thus, 
if bank value fall down, i.e. a decrease in market value of assets, the bank shareholders will be more incited to 
exercise their right when debts matures. 
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trying to invest in high returns but too risky projects,   
 Unwillingness of banks, after satisfaction of the regulatory requirement, to pay back 
their debts (principal and interests) since they are constrained to devote more profits in 
order to raise new capital, 
 Conflicts between shareholders and managers, mainly if the last ones hold less equity 
instruments than the first ones. So, if managers know that the leverage restrictions are 
expensive in term of profits, then they will decrease their effort in supervising 
borrowers, inducing more risky assets-portfolio, 
 
III. Some empirical findings 
 
After the definition and the adoption of Cooke ratio by the Committee’s members between 
1988 and 1993, empirical studies partly influenced by the theoretical debate (born once again 
in United States) on the prudential role played by capital standards, tempted to check if 
regulatory requirements may have an unexpected influence on bank’s behaviour by giving it 
an incentive to choose less secure (but more profitable) projects. Thus, the purpose of theses 
studies was not only to see if leverage restrictions entailed an increase of bank capitalization, 
but also to know if there are some unexpected effects induced by this regulation on bank’s 
portfolio quality. The problematic took more interest since it covers, henceforth, two 
questions: How do banks change their capital ratio under such regulation? And if this 
regulation does limits excessive risk-taking by bank managers?    
   
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) were the first to analyze this problematic empirically, their main 
innovation was to pretend that banks continually and simultaneously want to reach optimal 
levels of capitalization and returns. Knowing that expected loan returns and risk are 
proportional, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) estimated directly risk-preference expressed by banks8. 
The main objective of their study was to examine the behaviour of 1800 American banks 
under capital standards that came into effect in 1985. The sample was divided in two groups, 
a group containing undercapitalized banks that is banks whose capitalisation ratios were lower 
than the threshold fixed by the FDICIA9 (7%) and a group containing adequately capitalized 
banks. They found that undercapitalized banks adjusted more quickly their capitalization 
ratios than adequately capitalized banks. Estimation results also indicated that after the 
introduction of capital standards regulatory pressure induced had driven banks, with capital 
ratio near the minimal threshold, to reinforce their levels of capitalization and to curb their 
risk preferences relatively to other well capitalized banks. Theses findings support the capital 
regulation mechanism adopted in United States even before Basel I implementation, this was 
also proven by Keeley (1988). In fact, even before the application of common capital 
standards in United States by 198510, it was feasible to observe the effect of such capital 
regulation on undercapitalized banks’ behaviour. This was the purpose of Keeley (1988) who 
finds that capitalization gap between adequately capitalized banks (capital ratio above 5.5%) 
                                                 
8
 The most used indicators to infer bank preference to risky investment are the ratio of non performing loans on 
gross loans and the ratio of risk weighted assets on total assets.  
9
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, promulgated in 1991 in the United States. 
10
 In United States of America, the FDIC has attempted to require a minimal capital investment to banks 
sensitive to their risk profile. In 1975 the OCC, the national banks supervisory agency, have suggested a 
subjective assessment of required regulatory capital (Keeley, 1988). The OCC proposed to exert a regulatory 
pressure on banks who publish a capitalization ratio lower than capitalization median of the whole banking 
system (banks that are under the direct supervision of the OCC). In june 1985, in order to strengthen the 
protection of the FDIC’s insured funds, the Fed, The FDIC and the OCC, adopted the same regulation that fixed 
at 5,5% the minimal primary capital proportion on total assets for each bank independently of her size (Lacoue-
Labarth, 2003). 
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and undercapitalized banks shrank continually between January 1982 and June 1985. The first 
date announces, according to Keeley (1988), the beginning of discussions between the main 
three American supervisory agencies (cf. Foot note n°9) in order to find a common agreement 
to regulate capital investment undertaken by banks under their supervision. The statistical 
analysis performed by Keeley (1988) indicates that observed mean capital ratios that were 
below 5.5% in 1981 increased by 2.02 percentage points during the considered period. So it 
was obvious that during this period the observed levels of capitalization of the two groups of 
banks, i.e. undercapitalized banks and adequately capitalized banks converged over time 
showing that capital standards helped regulators to improve banking stability in United States. 
 
Other researchers were inspired by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) model in order to estimate if 
Basel I standards (Cooke ratio) enforcement contributed to strengthen banks in Committee’s 
members countries. Still in United States, implementation of Cooke ratio apparently triggered 
banks to decrease risk-tanking by improving the quality of their assets and to increase their 
capital ratios (Jaques and Nigro, 1997), although banks that displayed a lack of capitalization 
exhibited difficulty in generating supplementary equity instruments (Aggrawal and Jaques, 
1998) and took more risk in their investment decisions than well capitalized banks (Beatty 
and Gron, 2001). In Germany saving banks appear to reduce their capitalization when they 
take on more risk, this is in line with theoretical suggestions according to which implicit or 
explicit deposit insurance system, when not fairly priced, induce banks to increase their 
appetite for risky projects (Merton, 1977; Sharp, 1978; Kareken and Wallace, 1978). 
Moreover, the public statute of these banks may allows them to function with a minimum 
prudential constraints, so they don't have to adjust their level of risk-taking following a 
change in capitalization ratio (Heid and ali., 2003). Finally, well capitalized banks tend to 
increase assets risks following an increase of capitalization, as opposed to undercapitalized 
banks. Using a sample of 500 Italian banks Cannata and Quagliariello (2006) estimated a 
simultaneous equations model similar to Shrieves and Dahl (1992) model, and found that 
banks showing a capital ratio close to the minimum threshold 8% were slower to improve 
their credits quality between 1994 and 2003. Despite that these banks are more subject to 
regulatory pressure.  
 
However, contrary to German saving banks, undercapitalized Italian banks reduced more 
quickly their risk-taking following an increase in their capitalization. Empirical analysis 
undertaken by Rime (2001) on a sample of 154 banks in existence from 1989 to 1995 proves 
also that regulatory pressure exercised a significantly positive effect on Swiss bank 
capitalization. However, the adoption of Basel I rules did not influenced risk-taking by 
undercapitalized banks in Switzerland proving that despite their fragile situation these banks 
doesn’t commit themselves to improve their loans quality in order to conform with solvency 
rules. These findings give support to the fact that Swiss banks, generally, tried to conform 
with capital standards mostly by increasing their capital investment rather than by curbing 
their risk preference. In a comparative study Van Roy (2005) find that undercapitalized banks 
based in United State, unlike Italian and French banks, appear more sensitive to the 
introduction of Basel I capital standards via the FDICIA - and its Prompt Corrective Action - 
since they raised significantly their capital ratios after adoption of the Cooke ratio. With 
regard to Japanese banks, it is rather the opposite that happened since they proceeded 
simultaneously to an increase of their risk-taking with the increase of their capitalization. 
 
In emerging countries empirical conclusions are as confused as those found in developed 
countries. Recent empirical approaches derived from Shrieves and Dahl (1992) gives 
mitigated results. The most complete survey, focusing exclusively on banking systems in 30 
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emerging countries, was done by Godlewski (2005)11, although the author doesn't specify the 
activity field of selected banks (business, saving or commercial banks), he noted that the 
undercapitalized banks felt difficulties to improve and to maintain their solvency. However, 
the regulatory pressure showed negative relation with risk-taking initiatives and positive 
relation with capitalization level. In addition, Godlewski (2005), like Mingo (1975) for the 
American case, shown that the frequency of intervention conducted by deposit insurance 
fund to rescue banks (if such a prudential mechanism exists), may induce moral hazard 
problems by causing these banks to operate with less equity capital. Nevertheless, the 
deposits insurance system didn't exercise any considerable effect on risk-taking by banks in 
emerging countries. However, governmental banks (where state is the main shareholder) 
seems to vary downwards their equity to total assets ratio, maybe because in case of 
difficulties, an intervention or a subvention is more expected for these banks, this result has 
also been observed on Indian public banks (Das and Gosh, 2004). Godlewski (2005) 
observed also that banks operating under weak and opaque legal environment hold more 
capital, maybe to protect themselves from losses generated by uncertainty prevailing on 
contracts enforcement. Thus, doubts subsists concerning the impact of capital standards on 
banks established in emerging countries, as shown in the recent survey of Hassan and 
Hussain (2005) from the university of New Orleans; the regulatory pressure didn’t have any 
repercussion on commercial bank capitalization operating in a sample of 11 emerging 
countries. Yet theses banks reduced significantly their risk preference in order to fall into 
regulatory requirement. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), banks seem to 
conform adequately with capital standards, this was demonstrated by Murinde and Yaseen 
(2004) on a sample of 98 banks belonging to 11 countries. Indeed, regulatory pressure 
exerted by capital standards enforcement is likely to incite banks in this region to increase 
significantly their holdings in equity instruments. However, no evident results suggested that 
undercapitalized banks wanted to improve the quality of their loan-portfolios between 1995 
and 2002. Also, implementation in 1999 of capital standards, following Basel I directives, by 
the Central Bank of Tunisia had not triggered a reduction of the risk-taking by Tunisian 
banks, even though capital requirements pushed these banks to boost their equity investments 
(Bouri and Ben Hmida, 2006). In Egypt the reinforcement of capitalization, subsequent to the 
introduction of the capital standards, had driven an increase in credit costs fixed by the 
Egyptian banks. Bennaceur and Kandil (2006) indicate that, in Egypt, following the increase 
of the banking equity capital investments, the increasing implication of shareholders toward 
guaranteeing the solvency of their banks, incited them to ask for a higher risk premium. 
These arguments coincide with the theoretical proposition formulated by Blum (1999). It 
confirms, to a certain extent, that capital regulation led infine to a reduction of Egyptian 
bank’s risk profile. Authors also specify that higher capitalization base didn't restrain 
Egyptian bank profitability, in fact, capital adequacy induced an increase in assets returns 
(Return One Assets), possibly provoked by the improvement of credit quality or by relieving 
the weight of doubtful assets in the balance sheet. However, it was proven by Ling Linen and 
ali. (2005) that capital standards imposed to Taiwanese banks (24 state held and 16 privately 
held banks) didn’t have the expected effects, since this prudential mechanism merely led to 
an increase of bank insolvency risk. This result could be interpreted theoretically through the 
difficulty that felt these banks to increase the return of their assets after conforming 
themselves with capital requirements and clearing-off risky but profitable investments 
(Berger and ali. 1996). Nevertheless, to explain their results, Ling Linen and ali. (2005) 
sustain the hypothesis of optimal portfolio choice introduced, among others, by Koehn and 
Santomero (1980), pretending that leverage restrictions incites non-sufficiently risk-averse 
                                                 
11
 A sample of 2779 banks based in three different geographic areas: Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
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banks to increase the relative level of risky assets composing their loan-portfolio in order to 
optimize the choice between expected return and volatility.  
 
The motivation behind the conformity of banks with minimum capital requirements could 
depend, also, on their ownership structure, i.e. on shareholder concentration; this hypothesis 
has been tested empirically by Godlewski (2005), whose results agree with those found by 
Jetschko and Jeung (2007). Using a panel data set, Jetschko and Jeung (2007) observed 14 
commercial banks and 114 mutual saving banks based in South-Korea, the purpose of their 
survey was to discriminate between publicly-quoted banks (supposes the absence of major 
shareholder) and banks of small size, i.e. mutual saving banks which are non-quoted (with a 
dominant shareholder, so there is a convergence between managers and shareholder’s 
interests). Knowing that the commercial banks are large sized (The mean assets volume 
estimated by Jetschko and Jeung (2007) is nearly 51 billions of wons, that is 48 billions of 
US dollars) results indicate that the more publicly quoted-banks are undercapitalized, the 
more they will have a preference to risky behaviour. This would be due to confidence 
assigned by the government to these banks because of the easiness with which they can 
access equity markets in order to refund themselves during critical periods. This result 
suggests that capital regulation is not binding for large sized and publicly quoted commercial 
banks in South-Korea, even though these banks operate with a high leverage. On another side 
Results show that for the non-quoted banks, i.e. the majority of saving banks, the relation 
between capitalization and risk-taking is negative, whereas it is positive for the commercial 
banks. Jetschko and Jeung (2007) explain this result by the fact that in large publicly-listed 
banks the manager’s involvement in supervising contracted loans tends to ‘dilute’ as their 
share in capital decreases, generating a hazardous behaviour12 . We suggest an a priori 
different answer, we think that in private banks the manager/shareholder will tend to behave 
carefully when he invests more of his own funds to finance new projects, whereas at large 
sized banks equity capital is distributed between outsiders and insiders, therefore more risk-
taking serves to reach a higher expected return required by shareholders, thus any 
capitalisation increase must be satisfied by an increase in profitability and in risky assets13.  
 
IV. Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
The above-stated empirical studies have all a common purpose that is to test if risk-based 
capital standards effectively reinforced banking stability in developing and advanced 
countries. Our approach to this question will be different and, according to us, more concrete. 
This empirical study is inspired from those done by Keeley (1988), Shrieves and Dahl (1992), 
                                                 
12
 The authors give two different explanations to this risky behaviour : the first goes with Gorton and Rosen 
(1992) arguments that a bank manager don’t want to be fired by outsiders shareholders, so he will be more ready 
to seek, may be hazardously, new earnings activities.  The second explanation is similar to the one proposed by 
Besanko and Kanatas (1996) stating that the ‘dilution’ or the decrease of manager’s participation in bank equity 
shares (so a decrease in his expected earnings) discourage him to put adequate effort in supervising outstanding 
claims. 
13
 Dewatripont et Tirole (1994) have theoretically shown that when a bank faces difficulties, especially when their 
debts outclass their future earnings, thus as it was the case for the S&L’s associations during the 80’s in the United 
States, these banks will be probably more exposed to default risk because of a double moral hazard problem. 
Indeed, in such a circumstance managers and shareholders’ interests tend to converge inducing the so-called 
double moral hazard behaviour. As consequences, when facing financial difficulties, the shareholders will be less 
involved in manager’s investments choices, and hoping for new sources of returns, they will not interfere as long 
as the situation is critical. This behaviour is known as a gambling on resurrection, however according to Jetschko 
et Jeung (2007) this was not the situation of the Korean banking system since 2001, the date when the government 
achieved his restructuring initiatives.   
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and also Rojas-Suarez (2001a). Nevertheless, our survey is more closer to that performed by 
Rojas-Suarez (2001a), who tried to verify (on a sample of 135 banks based in South-East Asia 
and in Latin America) if yes or no capitalization ratio was an effective early warning indicator 
for banking distress in these countries. The power of capitalization ratio to predict banking 
crises has been estimated using noise and signal analysis, and also by comparing 
capitalizations means and medians, observed on failing banks (that were rescued by their 
respective government) and non failing banks. This comparison was performed using Student 
t test for means comparison and the Wilcoxon test for medians comparison. The results were 
suggestive, revealing that among constructed indicators of bank fragility (constructed using 
the CAMEL typology 14 ) only capitalization ratio was not robust in predicting banking 
problems. Nevertheless, we thought that two main shortcomings alter the empirical findings 
of Rojas-Suarez (2001a, 2001b). The first is that results don’t give any obvious ideas on 
whether there was any stabilizing effects induced by capital standards implementation, to say 
differently, it is evident, according to Rojas-Suarez’s estimations results that even though a 
bank is well capitalized, it is always subject to bankruptcy, however we think that this risk of 
bankruptcy may be systemic and independent of loans quality. In other words, if Rojas-Suarez 
had specified that banking shortcomings have been caused, precisely, by a bad management 
of credits, by a lack in provisioning, by an under - investment in equity capital or by a highly 
leveraged loans, in this case we can conclude that the level of capitalization didn’t have any 
effect on these indicators and on the overall stability of banks based in emerging countries. 
The second shortcoming in Rojas-Suarez (2001a, 2001b) findings is that banking fragility 
often emerge before the occurrence of a crisis and persist over time, so we don’t know if the 
capital adequacy regulation really helps banks to overcome fragilities during periods where no 
systemic crisis occurred, however Rojas-Suarez (2001a, 2001b) provided no answers to this 
question. In this paper, we will run a comparative analysis using data coming from financial 
statements related to commercial banks operating in emerging countries and also in 
Committee’s members countries, i.e. developed countries. Moreover, through this study we 
will proceed to a comparison of the financial situation between adequately capitalized banks 
and undercapitalized banks established in these two groups of countries. To this end, five 
indicators were selected in order to assess bank stability, these indicators come from the 
CAEL rating methodology (cf. Foot note n° 14). In order to differentiate between these two 
categories of banks, we are going to use a non-parametric test called Wilcoxon rank sum test15. 
Data on consolidated basis were extracted from The OSIRIS database (Bureau van Dijsk 
Electronic Publishing, SA) for 1995 – 2005 period. From this database it is possible to 
observe several commercial banks features i.e. the amount of assets or the volume of activity 
of each bank, if the bank is quoted on the local stock market, if a bank has either been 
liquidated or absorbed by another bank or by a banking group, etc. in order to homogenize as 
most as possible our sample and to make it sufficiently representative we used the following 
selection criteria:    
   
                                                 
14
 The CAEL rating process was defined by the FDIC in 1985, it serves to rank banks according to a set of 
indicators tied to several the overall financial situation of a bank: Capital adequacy, Assets quality, Earnings, 
Liquidity. The rating method named CAMEL add another indicator of bank stability: Management. 
15
 F. Wilcoxon (1945) :  « Individual Comparisons by Ranking Methods », Biometrics Bulletin, vol. 1, n° 6, pp. 
80-83. Available on the web : http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0099-4987%28194512%291%3A6%3C80%3AICBRM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P. 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test (also called Mann-Whitney or Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test) is a non parametric 
approach that permits to classify observations using a ranking methodology rather than comparing values 
directly. So, Wilcoxon’s w statistic is similar to the Student’s t, but it is more desirable than the Student test 
because it is a non parametric approach that is less sensitive to the non normality of distributions and more 
robust to extreme values.  
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 First of all, we can’t start this research without keeping commercial banks (Code 
OSIRIS: 602 commercial Banks) that are submitted to a capital standards similar 
to the Cooke ratio defined by the Committee. To this end, all jurisdictions (out of 
Committee countries members) that apply a regulatory framework inspired by 
Basel accords directives were identified using the databases constructed by Barth 
and ali. (2000, 2003 and 2007) that point out if capital regulation mechanism in a 
country is compliant with Basel principles.  
 Then, we kept the most representative banks, in term of activity volume, in their 
respective economies by selecting banks whose shares are issued and exchanged 
on their respective local stock market. Moreover, a bank will be rejected from the 
sample if their total assets volume doesn’t exceed 100 M$.    
 During the observation period, banks that have been submitted to a judicial 
liquidation have been withdrawn of the sample. However, banks that have been 
absorbed by other banks or by a financial group and banks that merged with other 
credit institutions have been kept because their financial accounts appear, 
nevertheless, in the balances-sheets of acquiring institutions.    
 Finally, we introduced banks who publish consolidated balances-sheet data in 
order to avoid double counting problems (Code OSIRIS: C1 and C2).  
  
This selection procedure considerably reduced the original sample and knowing that data 
related to total capital ratios and to credit quality (the proportion of non performing loans) are 
often unavailable, our sample shrunk to 307 commercial banks based in emerging countries 
and 130 commercial banks operating in developed countries, that is the Committee’s 
members (except Belgium, because of data unavailability). Thus, 39 countries have been kept 
in our sample: 29 belonging to the group of emerging countries situated in four geographical 
zones and 10 Committee members’ countries (cf. appendix).    
 
Otherwise, since before 1995 data relative to banks operating in emerging countries is not 
always available, we chose a period of 11 years going from 1995 to 2005. This choice is, 
according to us, adequate because during this period all countries members of the Committee 
and the majority emerging countries jurisdictions have already adopted the Cooke ratio or a 
similar standard. Observations on banks installed in countries that did not began yet to apply 
Basel I directives in 1995 have not been taken into account, we mention here commercial 
banks of Brazil or Philippines, for example.   
   
The hypothesis H0 that we are going to test using the Wilcoxon’s statistic w, will inform us 
about what the Cooke ratio had brought in term of stability for the commercial banks; 
especially those based in emerging countries.   
    
H0: In emerging countries, where banking authorities 
adopted a capital standard similar to the Cooke ratio, 
adequately capitalized banks, i.e. the banks that conforms 
the most with capital regulation, are more stable than 
undercapitalized banks. Knowing that bank stability is 
judged through five indicators: economic asset returns, 
leverage, loans losses provisions, the proportion of non 
performing loans and Tier 1 investment.   
 
Undercapitalized banks are those who publish a Total Capital Ratio, or Cooke ratio (CAR) 
lower than the first quartile (Q1) of the CAR ratio’s distribution. Whereas, adequately 
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capitalized banks shows a capital adequacy ratio higher than the third quartile (Q3) of the 
CAR ratio’s distribution. We opted for this selection procedure because if we take 
undercapitalized banks as banks who CAR ratio is lower than the regulatory minimum (8% in 
the United States, or 12 % in Jordan, for example), in this case we can not dispose of 
sufficient observations in order to perform estimation, for the reason that there is few banks 
who do not respect minimal requirements in our sample.  
 
The descriptive statistics presented in the Table n°1, give a preliminary result on commercial 
banks situation in emerging countries (EMR), during the analysis period. First we notice that 
undercapitalized banks have greater mean size (volume of assets) than adequately capitalized 
banks, indeed, this can be explained by the fact that big banks can reach national or 
international financial markets more easily in order to increase their capitalization during 
critical moments and they are more able to diversify assets risks. This allows them to operate 
with less regulatory capital. This result is also observable in developed countries (DEVP).    
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, returns on assets performed by undercapitalized banks are negligible 
(0.24%) compared to those observed in the adequately capitalized banks (2.98%). In short, 
let's note that it exist a significant difference between mean NPL (Non Performing Loans) 
ratio observed in undercapitalized banks (5.07%) and NPL ratio observed at the adequately 
capitalized banks (2.80%) based in developed countries, however this difference is less 
meaningful when considering banks operating in emerging countries. Curiously, it appears 
that in these countries more capitalized banks suffer more credit losses than undercapitalized 
ones. Wilcoxon’s test will give us more accurate results. 
 
All the tables containing estimations results are in the appendix. We start with testing if there 
is a significant difference between returns on assets (ROA) observed at adequately and 
undercapitalized banks. First of all, it seems that the Asian banking crisis have provoked a 
decrease in the ROA ratio in the two categories of banks between 1998 and 2000, although the 
table 4.a shows that it exists a positive and significant difference (the statistical w is 
Table n°1. Descriptive statistics* 
 
Variable Total sample Undercapitalized (CAR≤Q1) Adequately capitalized (CAR≥Q3) 
 EMR DEVP EMR DEVP EMR DEVP 
ROA 1.37% 
(1.11%) 
1.11% 
(1.11%) 
0.24% 
(0.69%) 
0.41% 
(0.37%) 
2.985% 
(1.99%) 
1.666% 
(1.16%) 
LEV 103.41% 
(98.62%) 
93.80% 
(91.67%) 
105.53% 
(101.15%) 
90.01% 
(94.71%) 
109.56% 
(91.61%) 
101.21% 
(93.57%) 
LLP 2.33% 
(1.20%) 
0.82% 
(0.55%) 
1.92% 
(1.11%) 
0.88% 
(0.61%) 
0.951% 
(1.18%) 
0.864% 
(0.48%) 
NPL 10.93% 
(6.27%) 
3.22% 
(1.79%) 
10.75% 
(6.43%) 
5.07% 
(4.83%) 
12.32% 
(6.171%) 
2.803% 
(1.13%) 
CAP 9.51% 
(8.39%) 
7.31% 
(6.22%) 
5.81% 
(5.58%) 
4.69% 
(4.45%) 
14.47% 
(13.06%) 
10.649% 
(10.424%) 
N 2124 1179 549 300 535 295 
Total Assets 
(Md$) 
3,151 
(3,524) 
20,348 
(31,973) 
5,542 
(6,075) 
42,732 
(38,216) 
2,055 
(2,103) 
4,093 
(1,813) 
* The percentages represents mean values of observed variables (median between brakets) between 1995 and 2005. N is the 
total number of observations. Total Assets (mean value) are expressed in thousand of million US dollars. Considered samples 
refers to total sample, undercapitalized banks sample and adequately capitalized banks sample based in emerging (EMR) and 
developed (DEVP) countries. ROA= net Result /Total Assets ; LEV= Demand deposit and short term funds /non liquid assets ; 
LLP=Loan loss provisions/Gross Loans ; NPL=Non performing Loans/Gross loans ; CAP=Tier1/Total Assets. 
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significant at 1% for all periods of observation) between the profitability of adequately 
capitalized banks and the one of weakly capitalized banks. Therefore, according to these 
findings we can deduce that risk-based capital adequacy enhance profitability of banks, this 
result confirm and empirical results found by Bennaceur and Kandil (2006). Furthermore, 
looking at Table 4.a and since our sample is relatively dominated by Asian commercial banks, 
we can mention that during periods of financial tensions that occurred in South East Asia, 
profitability in adequately capitalized banks decreased less (with more than 99% of 
confidence level) than in undercapitalized banks. Banks classification procedure, using the 
second quartile (Q2), don’t reject these results. Moreover, these results are similar to those 
obtained on developed countries’ banks (cf. table 4.b). Nevertheless, it is important to make 
attention to the endogeneity of ROA ratio when it is associated to banks’ capitalization ratio 
(CAR). Indeed, these results can be biased if we consider the case that more profitable banks 
are more able to recapitalize using retained earnings, after the distribution of dividends, this 
can explain why high CAR ratio may be associated with more profit, i.e. a higher ROA ratio. 
 
On the other hand, adequately capitalized banks seem to operate with a lower leverage ratio 
(LEV) than undercapitalized banks. Thus we think that one of the principal prudential 
objectives targeted by the adoption of Cooke ratio was reached, since that the wilcoxon’s 
statistic w, that expresses the leverage difference between adequately capitalized and 
undercapitalized banks is negative and becomes significantly less than zero between 1998 and 
2001. However, table 5.b don’t give similar results for banks operating in the Committee’s 
members, since more capitalized banks operate with more leverage. Nevertheless, the results 
of table 5.b are meaningless because the statistic w is not significant.  
 
As we noted earlier in this paper, our sample is dominated by Asian banks, this probably 
explain why in 1998 there is a significant difference between Loan losses Provision (LLP) 
ratios at adequately and undercapitalized capitalized banks based in emerging countries. The 
firsts have apparently succeeded to cover more of their expected losses than the seconds 
during 1995 – 1999 periods, especially in 1998. Whereas, in the following six years (2000 – 
2005) undercapitalized banks raised more provisions than adequately capitalized banks (p-
value < 4%). We can deduce that less capitalized banks were not able to prevent credit losses 
accumulation during stress periods. Theses banks exhibited insufficiencies in their 
provisioning (LLP) policies, showing that they were not incited to improve their solvency, 
probably to not oppress their already weak profits, as the shown in table 4.a.    
 
Concerning the impact of capital standards on credits quality, once again, the results exposed 
in table 7.a confirm that in emerging countries adequately capitalized banks seems to be more 
protected against credit losses, since that the difference between NPL ratio medians, inferred 
by the w statistic, in the two categories of banks is negative although not significantly.  This 
result is expected, because the level of capitalization should reflect the quality of banks loans-
portfolio. Furthermore, the prominent fact is that as shown for the LLP ratio (cf. table 6.a.), 
tests indicate that there is a negative and significant difference (p-value < 10%) between the 
NPL ratios in the respective categories of banks in 1998. Thus, banks that conform the most 
with capital adequacy standards were not only able to protect themselves against anticipated 
losses, they were also in position to prevent non performing loans accumulation during 
episodes of financial distress. Nevertheless, theses findings are weakened by the results 
showing that NPL ratio observed in adequately capitalized banks increased from year 2000 to 
reach a pick of 13.717% in 2002. Tests suggest also that there is not a significant difference 
between assets quality in the two categories of banks. Whereas, results displayed in the table 
7.b. prove the opposite in developed countries. In fact, in the developed countries it is obvious 
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that a bigger conformity to the Cooke ratio has been associated with an improvement of banks 
investments quality. Table 7.b. shows that in developed countries undercapitalized banks 
suffer a proportion of non-performing loans significantly superior (p-value < 1%) to that 
observed in the adequately capitalized banks for all the whole observed period. So, we can 
asserts that in emerging countries, contrary to developed countries, a higher conformity to the 
Cooke ratio is not synonymous to a better credits quality, in other words, the influence of such 
a prudential mechanism would clearly be called into question in emerging countries, since 
that it didn't succeeded to reach its major objective, that is the reduction of credit risk.   
 
Finally, observing results presented in Table 8.a and Table 8.b, it is obvious that adequately 
capitalized banks invests more Tier 1 instruments than undercapitalized banks in the two 
groups of countries. This result is not amazing, even though we notice that the gap in Tier 1 
investment observed between the two categories of banks is higher in emerging countries (a 
higher w statistic). 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The discussion around the influence of capital standards on banking stability in emerging 
countries clearly expanded following the adoption of capital adequacy directives suggested by 
the Committee. This study is part of this discussion. The purpose of this paper was to test if 
conformity to the Cooke ratio prudential mechanism is followed by more banking stability in 
emerging countries, then we sought to see if adequately capitalized banks were more robust 
than undercapitalized ones. To this end we adopted a simple approach in order to verify if the 
prudential mechanism consisting in covering credit risk with adequate regulatory capital 
serves to improve the financial situation of banks operating in emerging countries. We started 
this paper by revisiting the different empirical results testing the role of bank capital 
regulation. Some of these results were optimistic about the efficiency of this regulation 
(Murindes and Yaseens, 2004; Bennaceurs and Kandils, 2006; Bouri and Ben Hmida, 2006), 
but several findings were pessimistic (Rojas-Suarez, 2001a, 2001b; Godlewski, 2005; Ling 
Linen and ali., 2005; Jetschko and Jeung, 2007) toward the influence of such a prudential 
regulatory solution on banks’ stability in the emerging countries. This paper used a different 
approach than precedent empirical contributions. We used a relatively large sample 
exclusively composed of commercial banks. In fact, the sample includes 307 commercial 
banks installed in 29 emerging countries situated in four different geographical zones and we 
extended the study’s interest by incorporating 130 banks based in developed countries 
(countries that are members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) in order to 
complete the results with a comparative analysis between these banks and those belonging to 
emerging countries. Moreover, the observation period is large enough (11 years) adding a non 
trivial temporal dimension to this analysis. Our approach to the role of capital regulation was 
inspired from works done by Keeley (1988), Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Rojas-Suarez 
(2001a), since it opted for a comparison study. This comparison concerned two categories of 
banks: the adequately capitalized banks, i.e. those that display a high enough capital adequacy 
ratio, and the undercapitalized banks, i.e. those operating with the weakest level of regulatory 
capital relative to all banks selected in the sample. In theory more capital investment and 
adequately risk hedging goes with the improvement of financial situations, but can also 
induce unexpected behaviour by bank managers. Thus, five indicators have been chosen in 
order to assess the stability of a commercial bank, these indicators are constructed from the 
CAEL rating methodology defined in 1985 by the FDIC; these indicators classify banks 
according to their profitability, their investment in Tier 1 capital instruments, their assets 
quality and their availability in liquidity. The comparison of these indicators between 
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undercapitalized banks and adequately capitalized banks using the Wilcoxon non parametric 
test permitted us to note that in emerging countries:   
   
 Adequately capitalized banks are more profitable than undercapitalized banks.   
 Adequately capitalized banks restrain financial leverage much more than 
undercapitalized banks do.   
 Undercapitalized banks invest less Tier 1 instruments and are more vulnerable to 
credits losses that adequately capitalized banks during period of financial distress.   
 There is not a significant difference in credit risk between the two categories of 
banks. Whereas, in developed countries it is clear that adequately capitalized banks 
endure less loan losses.   
   
We cannot reject the fact that higher conformity to Cooke ratio enabled commercial banks 
operating in emerging countries to strengthen their profitability, constrained them to reduce 
leverage and to invest more primary capital instruments. However, the main objective of this 
prudential mechanism, that is preventing banks from credit losses, has probably failed in 
emerging countries. Looking at the results showed in table 7.a, we notice that even though 
banks increase their capital adequacy ratio, they are still, as undercapitalized banks are, 
exposed to a higher credit risk. We can refer to the theoretical and empirical arguments 
suggested among others by Koehn and Santomero (1980), Rochet (1992), also Hellman and 
ali. (2000) and Rojas-Suarez (2001b), to explain these findings. According to the empirical 
results, for banks based in emerging countries, we cannot accept the H0 hypothesis since the 
level of regulatory capital invested by these banks seems independent of their credits quality. 
However, as we noted earlier in this paper, we cannot deny that higher conformity with the 
Committee capital adequacy directives is a plausible solution to reinforce commercial bank 
stability in emerging countries, the unique matter, according to us and to our empirical 
findings, is how to make capital standards an efficient way in improving banks assets quality 
in emerging countries.   
 
Let us note, finally, that it would be useful to handle this problematic differently. This study 
should be more deepened in order to specify reasons behind capital standards inefficiency 
when applied in emerging countries: Is this inefficiency provoked by the weakness of the 
legal and judicial systems? Or by of lack of a sufficiently liquid stock markets on which bank 
equity capital instruments are transacted?  
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Table 2.a. Profitability in emerging countries’ commercial banks 
 
ROA 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 0.462% (0.78%) 
2.288% 
(1.505%) 
2.396** 
(0.0166) 
1.072% 
(1.15%) 
1.618% 
(1.09%) 
0.633 
(0.5265) 
1996 0.8316% (0.75%) 
2.585% 
(1.855%) 
3.903*** 
(0.0001) 
0.90% 
(0.90%) 
1.682% 
(1.29%) 
2.136** 
(0.0327) 
1997 0.464% (0.62%) 
2.372% 
(2.08%) 
5.517*** 
(0.0000) 
0.790% 
(0.81%) 
2.078% 
(1.74%) 
6.226*** 
(0.0000) 
1998 -0.536% (0.54%) 
1.697% 
(1.155%) 
4.464*** 
(0.0000) 
0.157% 
(0.72%) 
1.457% 
(1.435%) 
4.271*** 
(0.0000) 
1999 -0.865% (0.32%) 
1.276% 
(1.53%) 
4.197*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.389% 
(0.51%) 
0.966% 
(0.127%) 
4.413*** 
(0.0000) 
2000 -0.117% (0.42%) 
1.714% 
(1.435%) 
4.170*** 
(0.000) 
0.181% 
(0.595%) 
1.216% 
(1.445) 
4.758*** 
(0.0000) 
2001 -0.274% (0.375%) 
2.185% 
(1.26%) 
5.845*** 
(0.0000) 
0.280% 
(0.6%) 
3.621% 
(1.50%) 
6.031*** 
(0.0000) 
2002 0.066% (0.63%) 
1.854% 
(1.845%) 
5.825*** 
(0.0000) 
0.393% 
(0.71%) 
1.743% 
(1.685%) 
6.624*** 
(0.0000) 
2003 0.642% (0.74%) 
3.330% 
(2.625%) 
6.948*** 
(0.0000) 
0.905% 
(0.910%) 
2.511% 
(2.140%) 
7.949*** 
(0.0000) 
2004 0.252% (0.88%) 
2.635% 
(2.18%) 
6.730*** 
(0.0000) 
0.893% 
(0.109%) 
2.518% 
(2.150%) 
7.588*** 
(0.0000) 
2005 0.576% (0.905%) 
3.259% 
(2.985%) 
7.472*** 
(0.0000) 
1.134% 
(1.090%) 
2.772% 
(2.590%) 
7.822*** 
(0.0000) 
1995-1999 0.031% (0.615%) 
1.199% 
(1.765%) 
8.855*** 
(0.0000) 
0.370% 
(0.780%) 
1.470% 
(1.440%) 
8.119*** 
(0.0000) 
2000-2005 0.187% (0.715%) 
2.510% 
(1.805%) 
14.560*** 
(0.0000) 
0.633% 
(0.860%) 
2.153% 
(1.870%) 
16.181*** 
(0.0000) 
1995-2005 0.240% (0.69%) 
2.985% 
(1.56%) 
16.993*** 
(0.0000) 
0.547% 
(0.830%) 
1.914% 
(1.730%) 
18.071*** 
(0.0000) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the ROA difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean ROA ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 2123 observations on 307 commercial banks based in 29 
emerging countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table 2.b.  Profitability in developed countries’ commercial banks 
 
ROA 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 -0.094% (0.110%) 
2.278% 
(2.300%) 
4.956** 
(0.0166) 
0.474% 
(0.520%) 
1.988% 
(0.939%) 
6.152*** 
(0.0000) 
1996 0.160% (0.260%) 
1.353% 
(2.220 %) 
4.746*** 
(0.0001) 
0.522% 
(0.680%) 
1.464% 
(1.960%) 
5.685*** 
(0.0000) 
1997 0.373% (0.190%) 
1.949% 
(1.745%) 
5.486*** 
(0.0000) 
0.710% 
(0.765%) 
1.782% 
(1.74%) 
5.851*** 
(0.0000) 
1998 0.444% (0.510%) 
1.710% 
(1.760%) 
5.116*** 
(0.0000) 
0.733% 
(0.750%) 
1.571% 
(1.590%) 
5.466*** 
(0.0000) 
1999 0.332% (0.470%) 
1.488% 
(1.440%) 
4.384*** 
(0.0000) 
0.928% 
(1.015%) 
9.975% 
(1.230%) 
1.296 
(0.1950) 
2000 0.595% (0.495%) 
1.684% 
(1.590%) 
4.192*** 
(0.000) 
0.957% 
(0.915%) 
1.447% 
(1.130%) 
2.927*** 
(0.0034) 
2001 0.708% (0.360%) 
1.662% 
(1.530%) 
4.438*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7680% 
(0.550%) 
1.304% 
(1.200%) 
3.897*** 
(0.0001) 
2002 0.207% (0.265%) 
1.335% 
(1.510%) 
4.116*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3651% 
(4.050%) 
1.344% 
(1.510%) 
4.817*** 
(0.0000) 
2003 0.248% (0.200%) 
1.725% 
(1.880%) 
4.421*** 
(0.0000) 
0.630% 
(0.700%) 
1.663% 
(1.700%) 
4.857*** 
(0.0000) 
2004 0.582% (0.390%) 
1.367% 
(1.440%) 
3.687*** 
(0.0002) 
1.032% 
(1.020 %) 
1.337% 
(1.260%) 
1.878* 
(0.0604) 
2005 0.750% (0.530%) 
1.691% 
(1.330%) 
3.430*** 
(0.0006) 
1.030% 
(0.910%) 
1.471% 
(1.330%) 
2.472** 
(0.0134) 
1995-1999 0.161% (0.140%) 
1.545% 
(1.710%) 
9.313*** 
(0.0000) 
0.669% 
(0.760%) 
1.524% 
(1.650%) 
11.003*** 
(0.0000) 
2000-2005 0.468% (0.370%) 
1.563% 
(1.490%) 
10.160*** 
(0.0000) 
0.759% 
(0.700%) 
1.452% 
(1.350%) 
9.538*** 
(0.0000) 
1995-2005 0.419% (0.370%) 
1.666% 
(1.740%) 
15.125*** 
(0.0000) 
0.719% 
(0.725%) 
1.498% 
(1.480%) 
14.503*** 
(0.0000) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the ROA difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean ROA ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed  using a total of 1177 observations on 130 commercial banks based in 10 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table n° 3.a. Leverage in emerging countries’ commercial banks 
 
LEV 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 89.73% (86.82%) 
88.48% 
(81.49%) 
- 0.019 
(0.9849) 
90.24% 
(85.52%) 
112.75% 
(93.48%) 
1.552 
(0.1205) 
1996 %114.60 (99.62%) 
96.36% 
(87.48 %) 
-1.941* 
(0.0523) 
105.25% 
(97.97%) 
101.32% 
(92.29%) 
-0.540 
(0.5891) 
1997 102.98% (95.77%) 
98.44% 
(89.18%) 
-0.781 
(0.4349) 
102.26% 
(95.82%) 
101.26% 
(95.74%) 
0.164 
(0.8693) 
1998 105.79% (99.47%) 
102.63% 
(89.40%) 
-2.599*** 
( 0.0093) 
106.53% 
(99.96%) 
101.91% 
(90.08%) 
-2.709*** 
( 0.0067) 
1999 107.38% (99.05%) 
96.59% 
(87.49%) 
-3.002*** 
(0.0027) 
108.74% 
(104.39%) 
105.70% 
(91.85%) 
-3.176*** 
(0.0015) 
2000 107.15% (99.19%) 
104.51% 
(90.91%) 
-1.679* 
(0.0932) 
110.43% 
(101.73%) 
102.04% 
(90.38%) 
-3.657*** 
(0.0003) 
2001 108.96% (105.41%) 
108.40% 
(90.88%) 
-2.728*** 
(0.0064) 
107.18% 
(103.67%) 
109.61% 
(97.30%) 
-2.427** 
(0.0152) 
2002 108.20% (103.16%) 
116.45% 
(100.96%) 
-1.226 
(0.2200) 
107.83% 
(103.16%) 
114.64% 
(101.81%) 
-1.009 
(0.3130) 
2003 108.31% (103.67%) 
124.79% 
(101.13%) 
-0.954 
(0.3403) 
101.09% 
(101.63%) 
117.76% 
(101.13%) 
-0.215 
(0.8296) 
2004 91.84% (100.96%) 
112.59% 
(94.76%) 
-1.205 
(0.2280) 
102.01% 
(102.18%) 
109.20% 
(97.41%) 
-1.739* 
(0.0821) 
2005 103.30% (100.31%) 
110.22% 
(94.24%) 
-1.827* 
(0.0677) 
96.39% 
(100.51%) 
103.82% 
(92.61%) 
-2.621*** 
(0.0088) 
1995-1999 103.41% (97.76%) 
101.87% 
(87.87%) 
-3.309*** 
( 0.0009) 
104.40% 
(98.72%) 
103.82% 
(92.27%) 
-2.917*** 
(0.0035) 
2000-2005 116.83% (101.86%) 
113.93% 
(94.15%) 
-3.743*** 
( 0.0002) 
106.79% 
(102.00%) 
110.20% 
(97.18%) 
-4.125*** 
(0.0000) 
1995-2005 113.00% (101.22%) 
109.56% 
(91.61%) 
-5.482*** 
( 0.0000) 
106.17% 
(101.05%) 
108.05% 
(95.46%) 
-4.971*** 
(0.0000) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the LEV difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean LEV ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 2097observations on 307 commercial banks based in 29 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table 3.b. Leverage in developed countries’ commercial banks 
 
LEV 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 85.55% (95.14%) 
95.30% 
(94.46%) 
0.225 
(0.8221) 
101.09% 
(93.34%) 
98.44% 
(9.43%) 
0.195 
(0.8452) 
1996 87.71% (91.61%) 
100.64% 
(94.60 %) 
1.022 
(0.3069) 
95.20% 
(95.78%) 
104.03% 
(95.136%) 
0.533 
(0.5938) 
1997 84.98% (91.59%) 
113.31% 
(96.06%) 
1.894* 
(0.0582) 
91.16% 
(92.76%) 
108.31% 
(95.59%) 
2.178** 
(0.0294) 
1998 87.16% (87.34%) 
105.68% 
(94.25%) 
1.922* 
(0.0546) 
90.31% 
(90.13%) 
103.51% 
(94.43%) 
2.446** 
(0.0143) 
1999 89.81% (88.11%) 
100.23% 
(93.07%) 
0.618 
(0.5368) 
92.85% 
(91.22%) 
96.67% 
(94.26%) 
0.633 
(0.5269) 
2000 90.97% (94.75%) 
105.03% 
(95.23%) 
1.107 
(0.2684) 
90.22% 
(90.98%) 
98.56% 
(93.44%) 
0.404 
(0.6859) 
2001 90.57% (96.46%) 
99.57% 
(91.62%) 
-0.046 
(0.9637) 
91.09% 
(93.02%) 
93.49% 
(89.37%) 
-0.949 
(0.3428) 
2002 89.81% (95.30%) 
98.24% 
(89.82%) 
-0.593 
(0.5534) 
90.34% 
(91.21%) 
93.97% 
(88.65%) 
-0.811 
(0.4173) 
2003 92.96% (99.30%) 
95.05% 
(88.52%) 
-0.463 
(0.6437) 
90.18% 
(91.83%) 
91.30% 
(89.17%) 
-0.555 
(0.5792) 
2004 85.13% (94.71%) 
93.84% 
(91.35%) 
0.471 
(0.6374) 
85.19% 
(89.45 %) 
85.65% 
(81.85%) 
-0.923 
(0.3562) 
2005 85.97% (94.68%) 
92.38% 
(90.81%) 
0.404 
(0.6863) 
85.21% 
(86.21%) 
86.63% 
(85.81%) 
0.133 
(0.8939) 
1995-1999 90.13% (93.99%) 
101.32% 
(94.19%) 
0.781 
(0.4349) 
94.06% 
(92.57%) 
101.80% 
(94.41%) 
2.541** 
(0.0111) 
2000-2005 89.63% (96.20%) 
97.06% 
(91.01%) 
-0.150 
(0.8811) 
88.53% 
(90.00%) 
92.08% 
(88.61%) 
-0.599 
(0.5493) 
1995-2005 90.01% (94.71%) 
101.21% 
(93.57%) 
1.554 
(0.1201) 
91.31% 
(91.49%) 
95.66% 
(91.58%) 
0.373 
(0.7093) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the LEV difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean LEV ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 1160 observations on 130 commercial banks based in 10 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table n° 4.a. Loan loss provisions in emerging countries’ commercial banks 
 
LLP 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 1.976% (0.900%) 
2.276% 
(0.661%) 
-0.087 
(0.9307) 
1.876% 
(0.870%) 
1.496% 
(0.661%) 
-0.640 
(0.5223) 
1996 1.493% (0.936%) 
1.309% 
(0.671 %) 
-1.010 
( 0.3125) 
1.440% 
(0.628%) 
1.379% 
(0.882%) 
0.926 
(0.3545) 
1997 1.743% (0.974%) 
1.714% 
(1.077%) 
0.709 
(0.4786) 
1.852% 
(1.168%) 
1.434% 
(0.885%) 
-0.870 
(0.3841) 
1998 1.842% (0.813%) 
3.447% 
(1.976%) 
2.381** 
(0.0173) 
2.087% 
(1.104%) 
3.078% 
(1.713%) 
2.215** 
( 0.0268) 
1999 2.943% (1.041%) 
1.671% 
(1.427%) 
0.345 
(0.7302) 
2.756% 
(1.758%) 
2.242% 
(1.446%) 
0.038 
(0.9697) 
2000 2.535% (1.255%) 
0.654% 
(0.993%) 
0.761 
(0.4468) 
2.299% 
(1.477%) 
1.911% 
(1.455%) 
-0.468 
( 0.6394) 
2001 1.989% (1.304%) 
1.914% 
(1.692%) 
-0.121 
(0.9038) 
1.766% 
(1.309%) 
1.381% 
(1.499%) 
0.889 
(0.3737) 
2002 2.073% (1.633%) 
2.565% 
(1.654%) 
-1.226 
(0.2200) 
2.104% 
(1.637%) 
2.210% 
(1.434%) 
-1.172 
(0.2412) 
2003 1.559% (1.170%) 
2.283% 
(1.212%) 
0.191 
(0.8484) 
1.467% 
(1.170%) 
1.811% 
(1.147%) 
-0.217 
(0.8286) 
2004 1.370% (1.055%) 
0.850% 
(0.784%) 
-2.460** 
(0.0139) 
1.391% 
(1.086%) 
0.946% 
(0.839%) 
-2.789*** 
(0.0053) 
2005 1.073% (0.661%) 
0.766% 
(0.653%) 
-1.423 
(0.1548) 
1.063% 
(0.661%) 
0.925% 
(0.692%) 
-0.121 
( 0.9035) 
1995-1999 2.107% (0.930%) 
2.209% 
(1.534%) 
2.038** 
( 0.0415) 
2.120% 
(1.154%) 
2.108% 
(1.308%) 
1.412 
(0.0035) 
2000-2005 1.765% (1.161%) 
1.519% 
(1.012%) 
-2.125** 
( 0.0336) 
1.785% 
(1.214%) 
1.409% 
(1.056%) 
-2.705*** 
(0.0068) 
1995-2005 1.921% (1.143%) 
1.708% 
(1.183%) 
-1.082 
( 0.2794) 
1.807% 
(1.160%) 
1.696% 
(1.164%) 
-0.851 
(0.3948) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the LLP difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean LLP ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 2053observations on 307 commercial banks based in 29 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table n° 4.b. Loan loss provision in developed countries’ commercial banks 
 
LLP 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 1.127% (0.955%) 
1.775% 
(0.147%) 
0.026 
(0.9792) 
0.929% 
(0.431%) 
1.287% 
(0.586%) 
-0.097 
(0.9229) 
1996 1.363% (1.036%) 
1.592% 
(0.860 %) 
-0.846 
(0.3976) 
0.109% 
(0.591%) 
1.189% 
(0.558%) 
-0.448 
(0.6542) 
1997 0.911% (0.869%) 
0.627% 
(0.445%) 
-1.526 
(0.1270) 
0.728% 
(0.614%) 
0.564% 
(0.481%) 
-1.340 
(0.1803) 
1998 1.036% (0.600%) 
1.061% 
(0.697%) 
-0.041 
(0.9673) 
0.833% 
(0.517%) 
0.879% 
(0.623%) 
0.432 
(0.6657) 
1999 1.161% (0.778%) 
0.979% 
(0.660%) 
-0.939 
(0.3476) 
0.776% 
(0.547%) 
0.120% 
(0.575%) 
0.757 
(0.4490) 
2000 0.688% (0.494%) 
0.578% 
(0.454%) 
-0.708 
(0.4792) 
0.808% 
(0.537%) 
0.679% 
(0.527%) 
-0.904 
(0.3661) 
2001 0.523% (0.538%) 
0.729% 
(0.542%) 
0.436 
(0.6626) 
0.724% 
(0.591%) 
0.866% 
(0.661%) 
0.679 
(0.4971) 
2002 0.870% (0.581%) 
0.810% 
(0.549%) 
-0.548 
(0.5835) 
1.085% 
(0.651%) 
0.880% 
(0.761%) 
-0.24355 
(0.808) 
2003 0.801% (0.649%) 
0.792% 
(0.561%) 
-0.614 
(0.5393) 
0.743% 
(0.670 %) 
0.761% 
(0.596%) 
-0.457 
(0.6475) 
2004 0.738% (0.626%) 
0.374% 
(0.239%) 
-2.263** 
(0.0236) 
0.590% 
(0.442%) 
0.405% 
(0.374%) 
-2.132** 
(0.0330) 
2005 0.663% (0.516%) 
0.395% 
(0.262%) 
-2.386** 
(0.0170) 
0.527% 
(0.406%) 
0.425% 
(0.276%) 
-1.679* 
(0.0932) 
1995-1999 1.241% (0.955%) 
1.075% 
(0.561%) 
-2.909*** 
(0.0036) 
0.873% 
(0.366%) 
1.013% 
(0.542%) 
-0.619 
(0.5357) 
2000-2005 0.744% (0.546%) 
0.595% 
(0.400%) 
-3.429*** 
(0.0006) 
0.767% 
(0.543%) 
0.662% 
(0.490%) 
-2.078** 
(0.0377) 
1995-2005 0.883% (0.616%) 
0.864% 
(0.480%) 
-3.329*** 
(0.1201) 
0.811% 
(0.558%) 
0.809% 
(0.532%) 
-1.781* 
(0.0749) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the LLP difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean LLP ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 1166 observations on 130 commercial banks based in 10 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table n° 5.a. Non performing loans in emerging countries’ commercial banks 
 
NPL 
Période CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 w (p-value) 
1995 4.176% (2.719%) 
7.154% 
(4.209%) 
0.435 
(0.6634) 
4.174% 
(2.794%) 
6.092% 
(4.149%) 
1.065 
(0.2870) 
1996 1.834% (7.518%) 
3.804% 
(2.762 %) 
-0.740 
( 0.4593) 
6.854% 
(4.286%) 
4.082% 
(3.371%) 
-0.030 
(0.9759) 
1997 8.451% (5.738%) 
4.657% 
(3.717%) 
-0.732 
(0.4641) 
7.901% 
(5.256%) 
4.237% 
(3.086%) 
-1.423 
(0.1548) 
1998 7.835% (6.205%) 
3.995% 
(2.887%) 
-2.131** 
( 0.0331) 
6.974% 
(4.564%) 
6.667% 
(4.863%) 
-0.836 
( 0.4031) 
1999 15.122% (6.976%) 
10.738% 
(8.269%) 
-0.475 
(0.6346) 
15.423% 
(6.976%) 
12.222% 
(9.305%) 
0.463 
(0.6436) 
2000 12.335% (9.236%) 
11.102% 
(9.335%) 
-0.437 
(0.6621) 
11.456% 
(9.107%) 
12.670% 
(10.352%) 
-0.879 
(0.3793) 
2001 9.491% (6.981%) 
9.750% 
(5.526%) 
-0.721 
(0.4708) 
10.509% 
(9.006%) 
11.723% 
(7.215%) 
-0.047 
(0.9623) 
2002 11.071% (9.714%) 
13.717% 
(7.182%) 
-0.758 
(0.2200) 
10.744% 
(9.815%) 
12.200% 
(7.304%) 
-0.942 
(0.3462) 
2003 9.580% (6.184%) 
12.909% 
(7.376%) 
0.730 
(0.4654) 
10.376% 
(8.467%) 
12.414% 
(8.551%) 
0.819 
(0.4129) 
2004 9.745% (5.499%) 
10.856% 
(7.476%) 
0.708 
(0.4788) 
9.175% 
(6.498%) 
10.123% 
(6.446%) 
0.431 
( 0.6665) 
2005 6.544% (5.443%) 
9.874% 
(6.513%) 
1.292 
(0.1964) 
5.674% 
(3.689%) 
8.535% 
(5.570%) 
2.380** 
(0.0173) 
1995-1999 9.525% (5.469%) 
6.683%% 
(4.935%) 
-1.363 
(0.1729) 
9.391% 
(4.955%) 
7.552% 
(4.968%) 
-0.443 
(0.6576) 
2000-2005 9.569% (6.760%) 
11.316% 
(6.945%) 
0.383 
( 0.7017) 
9.701% 
(7.262%) 
11.053% 
(7.215%) 
0.772 
(0.4403) 
1995-2005 10.753% (6.438%) 
12.328% 
(6.171%) 
-0.172 
( 0.8638) 
9.530% 
(6.604%) 
10.348% 
(6.604%) 
0.755 
(0.4504) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the NPL difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean NPL ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 1649 observations on 307 commercial banks based in 29 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table n° 5.b. Non performing loans in developed countries’ commercial banks 
 
NPL 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 3.989% (3.327%) 
1.711% 
(1.019%) 
-1.871* 
(0.0613) 
2.157% 
(0.970%) 
1.234% 
(0.596%) 
-1.794* 
(0.0728) 
1996 3.821% (2.605%) 
3.114% 
(2.934 %) 
-0.755 
(0.4500) 
3.467% 
(2.605%) 
2.363% 
(0.843%) 
-1.950* 
(0.0511) 
1997 4.399% (2.147%) 
4.445% 
(0.492%) 
-1.4921 
(0.1356) 
2.996% 
(2.105%) 
3.059% 
(0.423%) 
-2.067** 
(0.0387) 
1998 5.217% (3.037%) 
4.145% 
(1.085%) 
-2.237** 
(0.0253) 
3.733% 
(1.885%) 
3.062% 
(1.178%) 
-2.221** 
(0.0264) 
1999 6.548% (5.575%) 
3.627% 
(1.342%) 
-3.030*** 
(0.0024) 
3.517% 
(1.735%) 
3.650% 
(1.325%) 
-0.918 
(0.3587) 
2000 4.960% (4.263%) 
2.755% 
(1.195%) 
-2.647*** 
(0.0081) 
4.679% 
(2.838%) 
2.585% 
(1.192%) 
-2.353** 
(0.0186) 
2001 4.888% (4.581%) 
2.125% 
(1.018%) 
-3.469*** 
(0.0005) 
4.185% 
(4.355%) 
2.296% 
(1.087%) 
-3.887*** 
(0.0001) 
2002 5.044% (4.653%) 
2.301% 
(1.187 %) 
-3.468*** 
(0.0005) 
4.155% 
(3.985%) 
2.113% 
(1.187%) 
-3.786*** 
(0.0002) 
2003 6.118% (5.914%) 
2.541% 
(1.365%) 
-2.843*** 
(0.0045) 
5.043% 
(4.148 %) 
2.183% 
(1.351%) 
-3.943*** 
(0.0001) 
2004 5.317% (5.974%) 
2.319% 
(1.570%) 
-2.628*** 
(0.0086) 
3.891% 
(2.361%) 
2.424% 
(1.249%) 
-1.664* 
(0.0960) 
2005 5.423% (5.767%) 
1.895% 
(1.000%) 
-3.298*** 
(0.0010) 
3.627% 
(1.550%) 
1.907% 
(1.083%) 
-1.889* 
(0.0589) 
1995-1999 5.149% (3.988%) 
3.702% 
(1.244%) 
-3.916*** 
(0.0001) 
3.249% 
(2.105%) 
2.710% 
(0.969%) 
-4.553*** 
(0.0000) 
2000-2005 5.446% (5.550%) 
2.332% 
(1.205%) 
-8.161*** 
(0.0000) 
4.231% 
(3.579%) 
2.229% 
(1.192%) 
-7.432*** 
(0.0000) 
1995-2005 5.073% (0.483%) 
2.803% 
(1.137%) 
-8.956*** 
(0.0000) 
3.941% 
(2.605%) 
2.391% 
(1.167%) 
-8.278*** 
(0.0000) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the NPL difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean NPL ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 941 observations on 130 commercial banks based in 10 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table n° 6.a. Tier 1 investment in emerging countries’ commercial banks 
 
CAP 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 4.830% (4.986%) 
15.029% 
(13.372%) 
4.362*** 
(0.0000) 
6.088% 
(5.541%) 
12.516% 
(10.036%) 
4.376*** 
(0.0000) 
1996 4.801% (4.771%) 
16.803% 
(12.212%) 
5.892*** 
( 0.0000) 
6.119% 
(5.971%) 
13.966% 
(11.293%) 
5.697*** 
(0.0000) 
1997 6.383% (5.742%) 
12.836% 
(11.046%) 
5.065*** 
(0.0000) 
7.531% 
(6.453%) 
10.706% 
(9.146%) 
5.076*** 
(0.0000) 
1998 6.192% (6.133%) 
12.971% 
(12.804%) 
5.647*** 
( 0.0000) 
7.296% 
(6.509%) 
11.118% 
(10.029) 
5.181*** 
(0.0000) 
1999 6.116% (5.500%) 
14.125% 
(12.252%) 
5.884*** 
(0.0000) 
6.686% 
(6.411%) 
11.820% 
(10.689%) 
6.882*** 
( 0.0000) 
2000 5.967% (6.200%) 
14.117% 
(9.335%) 
6.576*** 
(0.0000) 
6.636% 
(6.312%) 
11.745% 
(10.117%) 
7.389*** 
(0.0000) 
2001 5.614% (5.059%) 
14.860% 
(13.551%) 
7.669*** 
(0.0000) 
6.377% 
(5.739%) 
12.223% 
(10.856%) 
8.617*** 
(0.0000) 
2002 5.274% (4.530%) 
13.979% 
(12.711%) 
8.004*** 
(0.0000) 
6.334% 
(5.643%) 
12.019% 
(10.875%) 
8.572*** 
(0.0000) 
2003 5.399% (4.847%) 
14.628% 
(13.346%) 
8.195*** 
(0.0000) 
6.546% 
(6.124%) 
12.139% 
(11.120%) 
8.897*** 
(0.0000) 
2004 5.497% (5.199%) 
15.258% 
(13.082%) 
8.497*** 
(0.0000) 
6.769% 
(6.368%) 
12.640% 
(11.487%) 
9.673*** 
(0.0000) 
2005 6.066% (5.703%) 
15.006% 
(13.312%) 
7.934*** 
(0.0000) 
7.009% 
(6.697%) 
12.362% 
(10.535%) 
8.855*** 
(0.0000) 
1995-1999 5.905% (5.700%) 
13.796% 
(12.463%) 
12.123*** 
(0.0000) 
6.876% 
(6.230%) 
11.753% 
(10.072%) 
12.235*** 
(0.0000) 
2000-2005 5.643% (5.231%) 
14.795% 
(13.299%) 
18.996*** 
( 0.0000) 
6.632% 
(6.200%) 
12.286% 
(10.870%) 
21.544*** 
(0.0000) 
1995-2005 5.811% (5.583%) 
14.472% 
(13.065%) 
22.752*** 
( 0.0000) 
6.655% 
(6.175%) 
12.058% 
(10.533%) 
24.891*** 
(0.0000) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the CAP difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean CAP ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 2101 observations on 307 commercial banks based in 29 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table n° 6.b. Tier 1 invesment in developed countries’ commercial banks 
 
CAP 
Periode CAR≤Q1 CAR≥Q3 w (p-value) CAR≤Q2 CAR≥Q2 
w 
(p-value) 
1995 3.608% (3.817%) 
11.687% 
(11.424%) 
5.060*** 
(0.0000) 
5.006% 
(4.483%) 
9.804% 
(8.640%) 
6.198*** 
(0.0000) 
1996 3.736% (3.534%) 
12.630% 
(12.234%) 
5.569*** 
(0.0000) 
4.821% 
(4.611%) 
10.285% 
(9.610%) 
6.831*** 
(0.0000) 
1997 3.833% (3.478%) 
12.007% 
(10.791%) 
5.897*** 
(0.0000) 
4.724% 
(4.505%) 
9.969% 
(9.680%) 
6.789*** 
(0.0000) 
1998 4.444% (4.021%) 
11.935% 
(11.048%) 
5.977*** 
(0.0000) 
5.016% 
(4.667%) 
9.555% 
(9.045%) 
6.072*** 
(0.0000) 
1999 4.354% (3.593%) 
10.277% 
(10.525%) 
4.917*** 
(0.0000) 
5.750% 
(5.216%) 
8.592% 
(7.560%) 
3.710*** 
(0.0002) 
2000 4.970% (4.774%) 
10.408% 
(10.431%) 
4.435*** 
(0.0000) 
5.806% 
(5.493%) 
8.642% 
(7.718%) 
3.938*** 
(0.0001) 
2001 5.267% (5.055%) 
10.660% 
(10.147%) 
4.652*** 
(0.0000) 
5.759% 
(5.515%) 
8.811% 
(7.981%) 
4.503*** 
(0.0000) 
2002 4.814% (4.608%) 
9.990% 
(9.957%) 
4.679*** 
(0.0000) 
5.451% 
(5.005%) 
8.936% 
(8.287%) 
5.299*** 
(0.0000) 
2003 5.004% (4.634%) 
9.380% 
(9.196%) 
3.278*** 
(0.0010) 
5.583% 
(5.174 %) 
8.848% 
(9.027%) 
4.455*** 
(0.0000) 
2004 5.374% (4.636%) 
9.093% 
(8.265%) 
3.009*** 
(0.0026) 
6.455% 
(5.636%) 
8.122% 
(6.843%) 
1.738* 
(0.0821) 
2005 5.685% (4.954%) 
9.500% 
(9.328%) 
3.011*** 
(0.0026) 
6.346% 
(5.478%) 
8.188% 
(7.566%) 
2.422** 
(0.0155) 
1995-1999 3.965% (3.765%) 
10.317% 
(10.234%) 
9.594*** 
(0.0000) 
5.012% 
(4.664%) 
9.572% 
(8.976%) 
13.752*** 
(0.0000) 
2000-2005 5.049% (4.792%) 
9.774% 
(9.736%) 
9.472*** 
(0.0000) 
5.854% 
(5.280%) 
8.612% 
(8.022%) 
9.388*** 
(0.0000) 
1995-2005 4.693% (4.567%) 
10.649% 
(10.425%) 
16.282*** 
(0.0000) 
5.488% 
(4.997%) 
9.097% 
(8.710%) 
16.586*** 
(0.0000) 
The CAR ratio represents the Cooke ratio computed by the bank for each period. Wilcoxon’s w statistic estimate the CAP difference 
between adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks. The p-value is between brackets. Mean CAP ratio is presented in percentage 
(the median is between brackets). Estimations are performed using a total of 1178 observations on 130 commercial banks based in 10 
developed countries during the period 1995 – 2005. ***: Significance at 1%, **: Significance at 5%, *: Significance at 10%. 
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Table n°7. Capital requirements under the US/UK accord* and the Basel I accord 
 
Regulatory capital categories USA/UK accord   Basel I Accord (1988) 
Tier 1 : primary eligible capital 
• Common stock/equity and 
premium (UK), surplus (US). 
• Retained earnings. 
• General reserves for losses 
resulting from charges to 
earnings. 
• Hidden reserves. 
• Minority interest in 
consolidated subsidiaries. 
 
 
• Ordinary paid-up share 
capital/common stock 
• Disclosed reserves 
 
Tier 2 : complementary eligible capital 
 
• Preferred shares that do not 
mature or that mature on a 
fixed date and have an 
original maturity of at least 25 
years. 
• Subordinated debt that can 
only be converted into 
primary capital instrument, 
that is available at all times to 
absorb losses and provides 
that interest payments may be 
deferred if the issuer does not 
make a profit in the preceding 
period and/or pay dividends 
on common and perpetual 
preferred stock. 
 
• Undisclosed reserves. 
Asset revaluation reserves. 
• General provisions/general loan 
loss reserves. 
• Hybrid (debt/equity) capital 
instruments. 
• Subordinated term debt. 
Adjustments made to capital  
• Deduction of all intangible 
assets. 
• Deduction of investments in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries 
and associated companies 
including, but not limited to, 
unconsolidated joint venture. 
• Deduction of bank holding of 
capital instruments of other 
banking organizations. 
• Deductions from Tier 1 : goodwill 
• Deduction from total capital: 
investment in unconsolidated 
banking and financial subsidiary 
companies and investments in the 
capital of other banks and 
financial institutions. 
  
*
 This Accord was established in 1987 between United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA) under 
the authority of the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table n°8. Risk weights under Basle I prudential requirements 
 
Risk weights Category of assets 
0% 
• Cash. 
• Balances at and claims on domestic central bank. 
• Other claims on domestic central governments and OECD countries 
central banks. 
• Loans and other assets fully collateralised by cash or domestic central 
government securities or fully guaranteed by domestic governments. 
20% 
• Secured claims on Multilateral Development Banks (0% or 20%). 
• Claims on OECD countries’ banks, 
• Claims on non-OECD countries’ banks with a maximum maturity of 
one year. Loans with residual maturity of at most one year, secured by 
banks located out of OECD countries. 
• Claims on foreign central governments in local currency financed by 
local currency liabilities. 
• Cash items in process of collection. 
 
50% 
• Loans to owner-occupiers for residential house purchase fully secured 
by mortgage. 
 
De 0% à 50%* 
• Claims on the domestic public sector, excluding central government (at 
national discretion) and loans guaranteed by such institutions. 
 
100% 
• Claims on the private sector. 
• Cross-border Claims on foreign (non-OCDE) banks with an original 
maturity of one year and over. 
• Claims on foreign central governments (unless 20%). 
• Claims on commercial companies owned by he public sector. 
• Premises, plant and equipments and other fixed assets. 
• Real estate and other investments (including non-consolidated 
investment participations in other companies). 
• Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from 
capital). 
• All other assets. 
 
*  Risk weights determined by national authorities. 
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Table n°9. Selected countries and number of commercial banks in the sample 
 
Region Countries Number of observed banks Observation period 
China 14  1997/2005 
South Korea 8 1995/2005 
Indonesia 19  1995/2005 
Malaysia 10 1995/2005 
Philippines 15  1995/2005 
Taiwan 26  1995/2005 
Thailand  15 1995/2005 
Sri Lanka 5  1995/2005 
India 30 1995/2005 Ea
st
 
A
sia
 
a
n
d 
Pa
ci
fic
 
 Total banks                  142 (28 GB*) 
Saudi Arabia 9 1995/2005 
Qatar 4 1997/2005 
Jordan  11 1995/2005 
Lebanon 6  1995/2005 
Morocco 3 1997/2005 
Tunisia 6  1997/2005  M
id
dl
e 
Ea
st
 
a
n
d 
N
o
rt
h 
A
fr
ic
a
 
Total banks                    39 (4 GB) 
Argentina 4 1995/2001 
Brazil 24 1995/2005 
Colombia 6 1995/2005 
Chile 9 1997/2005 
Mexico 10 1995/2005 
Peru 3 1995/2005 
Venezuela 15 1995/2005 L
a
tin
 
A
m
er
ic
a
 
Total banks                    71 (7 GB) 
Germany 5 1995/2005 
Canada 9 1995/2005 
Danemark 17 1995/2005 
Spain 10 1995/2005 
France 8 1995/2005 
Italia 15 1995/2005 
Japon 25 1995/2005 
Switzerland 3 1997/2005 
United Sates of America 30 1997/2005 
United Kingdoms 8 1995/2005 
O
EC
D
 
co
u
n
tie
s 
 
 Total banks                          130 
Russia 14 1999/2005 
Turkey 15 1999/2005 
Poland 11 1995/2005 
Slovakia 3  1995/2005 
Croatia 5  1995/2005 
Czech Republic 3  1995/2005 
Lithuania 4  1995/2005 
Eu
ro
pe
 
a
n
d 
C
en
tr
a
l A
sia
 
 Total banks                    55 (2 GB) 
* Number of governmental commercial banks, in which the State own more than 50% of equity shares.  
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Table n°10. Capital standards and banking stability in emerging countries: some empirical evidences 
 
 
Sample1 / 
Periode Objectives of the study Estimation methodology 
Capital standards 
influence on banks2 
This study 
307 (29 
countries)3 / 
1995-2005 
Check if more capitalized 
banks are sounder than 
undercapitalized banks. 
Wilcoxon non parametric 
test 
- (credit risk) 
+ (assets earnings, 
leverage, Tier 1 
investment) 
Rojas-Suarez (2001) 
135 (6  
countries)4/ 
Episode de 
Crise bancaire 
Test if the degree of 
capitalization is a good signal 
for banking distress. 
Signal approach 
Student test 
Wilcoxon non parametric 
test 
Capitalization levels 
don’t predict episodes of 
banking crises. 
Murinde and Yaseen 
(2004) 
98 (11  
countries)5/ 
1995-2002 
Test how banks adjust their 
levels of capitalization and 
their risk-taking under 
regulatory pressure 
Simultaneous equations 
model 
+ (Capitalization levels) 
- (Risk-taking) 
Ling Lin, Penm and 
Chang (2005) 
40 (Taiwan)/ 
1993-2000 
Examine the influence of 
capital standards on bank 
solvency and profitability 
Ordinary Least Squares - (insolvency risk) 
Bennaceur and Kandil 
(2006) 
28 (Egypt)/ 
1989-2004 
Influence of capital regulation 
mechanisms on the cost of 
credits and on the profitability 
of banks 
Dynamic Panel data + (Risk-taking) 
+ (Assets earnings) 
Jetschko and Jeung 
(2007) 
128 (South 
Korea)/ 2002(4)-
2004(3) 
Assess the impact of capital 
standards on prudential 
behaviour of the Korean 
commercial and saving banks. 
OLS and fixed effects - (Risk-taking in 
commercial banks) 
1
 Number of banks (number of countries). 
2(-) indicate an unexpected bad effect or no effect and (+) means an expected positive effect. Indicators of banking stability subject to this 
effect are presented between brackets. 
3
 East Asia and Pacific, Latin America, Europe and central Asia, Middle East and North Africa. 
4
  Latin America et  South East Asia. 
5
  Middle East and North Africa . 
